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pReFACe
the region of Rough Cilicia, known in antiquity as Cilicia 
tracheia, constitutes the western part of the larger area of 
Cilicia and is characterized by the ruggedness of its territory, 
especially as compared to its ‘smooth’ sister-region to the 
immediate east, Cilicia pedias. the mountainous landscape 
had fundamental consequences for the history of the region. 
It limited agricultural production that in turn must have had 
an impact on the economy and size of population centers 
of the region relative to the larger urban centers of its 
agriculture-rich neighbors, smooth Cilicia and pamphylia, 
which bordered Rough Cilicia on the west. the forests 
that dominated the mountains of tracheiotis, however, 
compensated to some extent for the restricted farming. 
well known from the Hellenistic period through the Roman 
empire as a source of timber, primarily for shipbuilding, 
this natural resource had potential for considerable income. 
the rugged terrain also offered protection to the inhabitants 
during	 times	 of	 invasion	 and	 played	 a	 major	 role	 in	 the	
acculturation process of the region. In addition, the protection 
afforded by the high mountains combined with the rugged 
seacoast	 fostered	 the	 prolific	 piracy	 that	 developed	 in	 the	
late Hellenistic period, bringing much notoriety to Rough 
Cilicia, to such an extent that the terms “Rough Cilicia” and 
“piracy” go hand in hand.
Until relatively recently, however, Rough Cilicia could 
be considered terra incognita to modern scholarship. 
the pioneers of Rough Cilicia studies are few: Beaufort, 
Heberdey, wilhelm, Bean, Mitford, Rosenbaum, Huber, 
Russell,	Karamut,	Tomaschitz,	Equini	Schneider,	and	Rauh.	
the past few decades, however, have seen a shift in scholarly 
attention paid to the region. Beginning in the 1960s the 
well-preserved remains of Anemurium were systematically 
exposed by James Russell. More recently syedra and 
elaiussa sebaste have also undergone excavation. In the 
mid-1960s the survey led by elizabeth Rosenbaum-Alföldi 
and	Gerhard	Huber	produced	the	first	extensive	investigation	
of the architectural remains of Rough Cilicia. the resulting 
publication (Rosenbaum 1967) has yet to be superseded, 
although	beginning	in	1996	the	Rough	Cilicia	Survey	Project	
(RCsp), led by Nicholas Rauh, has explored a portion of 
the region in a controlled systematic fashion. the recently 
published preliminary report (Rauh et al. 2009) offers the 
first	systematic	view	of	the	long-term	urban	development	of	
Rough Cilicia, setting the stage for future research. 
such recent work has added considerably to our under-
standing	of	the	region.	Unavoidably,	however,	the	findings	
have been diffuse, the product of individual specialists and 
teams of researchers from a wide array of countries: turkey, 
Austria, Canada, denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, United 
Kingdom,	United	 States,	 among	 others.	 Several	 colloquia	
have	helped	to	overcome	this	deficiency,	and	our	purpose	in	
convening the conference, Rough Cilicia: New Historical and 
Archaeological Approaches at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln in 2007, was simple: to add to this process of 
synthesis by drawing upon the expertise of those scholars who 
have conducted important research in Rough Cilicia in order 
to assess the state of knowledge regarding the region. 
the papers in the volume are presented in approximate 
chronological order.  spelling conventions, always vexing 
in classical publications, are particularly problematic in a 
volume of this sort, which ranges widely from prehistory 
through Greek and Roman eras into the medieval period. 
Recognizing that no one convention is satisfactory, the editors 
have elected to use the Latin rather than the Greek spelling 
of all proper names in order to maintain consistency, hence, 
e.g., selinus rather than selinos and Antiochia ad Cragum 
rather	than	Antiocheia	epi	Krago.
the editors would like to thank the other organizing 
committee	members,	Hugh	Elton,	Ismail	Karamut,	Nicholas	
Rauh,	 and	 the	 late	 Kurt	 Tomaschitz,	 for	 their	 thoughtful	
help and suggestions that ultimately made the conference 
a success. we would also like to thank the individual 
contributors, for their cooperation in revising their conference 
presentations and their patience in seeing this volume to 
publication. A special note of appreciation is given to James 
Russell, not only for his help in the conference organization 
Preface
and subsequent editing of the papers, but also because of his 
pioneering work in the archaeology of Rough Cilicia.
the conference would not have been possible without the 
financial	assistance	of	a	number	of	sponsors.	The	University	
of Nebraska–Lincoln has earned our deep gratitude for its 
generous support of the conference. In particular we would 
like to thank the following: UNL Research Council; MedICI; 
edward Forde, Chair, department of Art and Art History; 
and Giacomo Oliva, dean, Hixson-Lied College of Fine and 
performing Arts.
we also extend our appreciation to Bailey Barnard, emma 
Clute, and Amanda washburn who assisted in certain editorial 
aspects of these proceedings, to Christy Aggens for her 
graphic designs and web mastery, and to Clare Litt at Oxbow 
Books for editorial and publication advice. special thanks 
are due to the two anonymous reviewers of the submitted 
manuscripts who made the papers better.
Finally,	we	would	 like	 to	dedicate	 this	volume	 to	Kurt	
tomaschitz, a member of our organizing committee, who 
was to present a paper at the conference but whose failing 
health at the time would not allow travel to Nebraska, and 
whose subsequent tragic death has left a great void in Rough 
Cilicia	studies.	Thank	you,	Kurt.
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Public Buildings and Civic Benefactions in Western Rough 
Cilicia: insights from signaling theory
LuAnn Wandsnider
1. Introduction
In the Hellenistic and Roman world of the eastern 
Mediterranean, Greek and Greco-Roman cities came to be 
defi ned by their physical cityscape, with public buildings that 
were the seat of various civic transactions among citizens 
and other residents. These buildings were constructed by 
specifi c city institutions, such as the council and the assembly, 
and fi nanced through city funds, mass subscription and, 
importantly, public benefactions. Public benefactions, which 
also included support for festivals and competitions, were 
made by certain elite and usually wealthy individuals to the 
benefi t of a defi ned community of citizens (and sometimes 
non-citizens, as in the case of fortifi cation walls). Institutions 
within the benefi ting community, again the council and the 
assembly, acknowledged these gifts with a published decree 
and inscriptions or statues situated in places of honor. 
Various scholars have commented on the appearance, 
form, and nature of the Greco-Roman cityscape in Anatolia. 
Here, I explore the utility of viewing this phenomenon 
through the lens of multi-level signaling theory. I suggest 
these public buildings constitute a conjoined individual-
communal “signal” that relayed important information to 
attentive citizens, nearby cities, and agents of Rome. This 
signal synergistically satisfi ed four ends: the elite effectively 
and materially conveyed their hidden talents to a diverse 
community, establishing position in a dynamic hierarchy and 
winning various rewards for themselves and family; non-elite 
citizens learned of and could make decisions about which 
of various contenders for positions of authority to support; 
city institutions materially signaled their communal values, 
maintaining the support of the citizens in spite of increasing 
wealth differentials; and fi nally the city communicated to 
external audiences (other local cities, Rome’s client kings, 
and later agents of imperial Rome) its ability to mount 
significant collective actions, thereby remaining viable 
if not outcompeting other cities for access to contested 
resources. 
I focus especially on western Rough Cilicia where both 
honorifi c inscriptions acknowledging civic benefactions and 
public building increase in frequency in the later fi rst century 
after Christ and then decline in the later third century after 
Christ,1 a pattern seen more generally for provincial Asia 
Minor.2 Western Rough Cilicia departs from other parts 
of Asia Minor in the composition of its cityscapes, which 
included public buildings like agoras, bouleuteria, and baths 
but show little evidence of larger public structures like arenas 
and theatres.3 Signaling theory,4 a body of theory based in 
evolutionary thinking that focuses on the differential benefi ts 
to individuals and groups who effectively send and receive 
signals about their hidden qualities (see below), offers insights 
as to why civic benefactions and public building should look 
different here compared with western Asia Minor. 
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2. Civic buildings and public benefactions in 
Hellenistic Anatolia and provincial Asia Minor
The Hellenistic period of the eastern Mediterranean was, 
as John Ma notes, the “age of the city-states [or] poleis…
of kings…and of elephants, gigantic warships, imperial 
processions, and stupendous feasting and drinking.”5 During 
this time Greek city culture expanded both within the greater 
Mediterranean basin and also to the east beyond through 
colonization and other means. Whereas the hundreds of 
colonies established during the heyday of early Greek 
colonization (750 – 550 BC) had been confi ned to coastal 
areas around the Mediterranean and Black Sea, during the 
Hellenistic period new cities (perhaps as many as 150) 
appeared in the wake of Alexander throughout Anatolia, 
Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.6 These cities likely 
represented previously existing cities that now included a 
Greek population, a new Greek name, and, critically, Greek 
civic institutions.7 Simultaneously, some non-Greek cities in 
Anatolia, such as Alabanda, came to adopt Greek political 
language and civic apparatus at this time.8 
Roman presence in the area gradually increased during the 
late Republic as the usurper Aristonikos and the Mithridatic 
rebellion on land and, later, piracy at sea attracted direct 
Roman involvement. By the imperial period, population 
centers of indigenous peoples along with resident Greeks and 
Romans (especially in interior Asia Minor) were deliberately 
organized into communities by agents of Rome and a city 
government based on a modifi ed Greek model was installed. 
Towns and other units were formally designated and made 
subordinate to nearby cities.9
Public buildings
The cityscape of Hellenistic Anatolian cities represented an 
accommodation to recent city history, topography, and the 
relative health of various institutions characteristic of Greek 
cities.10 The thriving urban culture of the Hellenistic cities is 
seen in the almost uniform presence of civic institutions with 
a material or architectural expression: an agora with nearby 
prytaneion, bouleuterion, stoas, temples and sanctuaries 
(some now dedicated to cults originating from Alexander’s 
East), gymnasium or gymnasia, a theatre, a stadium, an 
auditorium, a library, a commercial agora with shops, and 
city walls along with a secure water supply.11 
Early imperial Greco-Roman cities, almost by defi nition, 
featured earlier Hellenistic fortifi cations (walls, gates, and 
towers), religious structures (temples, sanctuaries, and altars), 
political meeting places (bouleuteria or basilicas and also 
large areas for public assemblies), well-defi ned cultural or 
educational structures associated with high urban culture 
(gymnasia, odeia, theatres, libraries), and civic amenities having 
to do with water supplies (baths, aqueducts, nymphaia).12 An 
additional feature of the city at this time were large decorative 
monuments, such as arches, statues, monumental inscriptions, 
and heroes’ tombs, that refl ected and amplifi ed the prestige 
of the wealthy and powerful, including the Roman emperor. 
Importantly for the discussion that follows, city status was 
indexed to the splendor of the cityscape.13
Construction costs were quite high in antiquity with, 
for example, a single medium-sized temple in North Africa 
in the second century after Christ costing 60,000 – 70,000 
sesterces14 or the equivalent of the annual subsistence for 
some 500 people.15 Thus construction of a public building 
was not a trivial matter. Some public buildings were built 
with labor donated by citizens but most seem to have been 
fi nanced in one of several ways. In the early Hellenistic 
era, the Successors to Alexander, in their attempts to recruit 
local support, may have gifted particular structures to cities. 
One may cite, for example, contributions to rebuild Rhodes 
after a devastating earthquake in 228/227 BC coming from 
Ptolemy III, Antigonus Doson, Seleucus III, Mithridates II, 
and others.16 Also seen are instances of local kings outfi tting 
their capital cities through publicly acknowledged gifts, as 
Eumenes did for Pergamon.17 In the later Hellenistic and 
Imperial periods, local wealthy individuals gifted their 
respective cities with structures, perhaps of their own volition, 
through peer pressure18 and pressure from subordinates,19 or 
through solicitation by the council or assembly.20 Similarly, 
a wealthy patron from outside the city may have contributed 
funds.21 In addition, the city may have solicited funds from 
citizens as public subscriptions to underwrite the cost of 
constructing specifi c buildings, at least in later Hellenistic 
times.22 In the case of these funding sources, we see material 
acknowledgement of the benefaction by the city council and 
assembly in inscriptions or statues placed in a prominent 
location. 
In addition, however, cities may have funded construction 
through internal resources, relying on taxes from trade 
and money-changing, rent, and annual payments for offi ce 
by city magistrates.23 Recent analysis of city documents 
for Bithynia, Lycia, and Ephesus shows that, contrary to 
previous interpretations, internal city funds might have been 
quite substantial.24 On this basis, Arjan Zuiderhoek argues 
that cities had more than adequate funding to build and 
maintain their splendid cityscapes without depending on the 
munifi cence of elite citizens.25
Public benefactions
As mentioned above, benefactions by elites were one means 
by which public buildings came to be constructed. That is, 
they were a product of an institution sometimes referred to as 
euergetism.26 In addition to benefactions of public buildings, 
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several other kinds of public benefactions are attested to in 
inscriptions. Some gifts were singular phenomena (such 
as underwriting a treasury defi cit) while others were more 
enduring (designating funds for regularly occurring festivals 
or a public building such as a bath). Some may be readily 
experienced by the citizens (funerary banquets, bathing oils) 
or by visiting foreign visitors (cult festivals, contests, games). 
Still others were appreciated either from within (bath, library, 
gymnasium) or from afar (fortifi cation walls).
For Paul Veyne and succeeding commentators, euergetism 
comprises several essential elements. It involved a particular 
and sizable gift, such as oil for baths, a foundation to support 
annual festivals remembering a loved one or god, food in 
time of crisis, a public building, and, later in Roman times, 
gladiatorial contests. In addition, the gift was made to all 
or to particular elements of the citizenry, in some cases 
reinforcing status differentials within the citizenry27 and, 
increasingly in late Hellenistic times, to non-citizens who 
were nevertheless residents of the polis or city. Of course, 
the gift of a public building could perhaps be seen by all, 
even if they did not directly benefi t from or participate in 
the transactions occurring therein. 
The gift size, nature, and location (in the case of buildings) 
were negotiated with “the people” (the city assembly) and 
sometimes were deliberately recruited by the council28 or 
the assembly.29 The gift was in fact made, as opposed to 
merely being promised, which also occurred and against 
which laws were enacted.30 And, as importantly, the gift 
was acknowledged by the city in city records, in honorary 
decrees set up in a public place, perhaps with a statue of the 
benefactor, or both. As Zuiderhoek emphasizes in his recent 
treatment of public benefactions during the Imperial period, 
a euergetes was not a euergetes until his or her benefaction 
was acknowledged.31 Thus, the gift and its acknowledgement 
represented the end result of a successful (and sometimes 
protracted) negotiation between the benefactor and city 
institutions (council and assembly). 
Veyne, Maud Gleason, and Zuiderhoek emphasize the 
activist ethos of Greek culture within which public benefactions 
occurred.32 That is, one’s virtues were demonstrated through 
one’s deeds. Thus, benevolence, excellence, love of honor, 
generosity, love of goodness, zeal, munificence were 
deliberately put on display through acts of public benefaction 
by the elite and such displays justifi ed their positions of power. 
This is the emic aspect of public benefactions.
Scholars have also offered various etic perspectives on 
public benefactions, recently reviewed by Zuiderhoek. To 
these he adds another, arguing that for the cities of Roman 
Asia Minor, public benefactions served as the mechanism 
by which the civic oligarchy (that is, wealthy elite selected 
to the city council for life by other wealthy elite and then 
affi rmed through popular vote) and the non-elite citizens 
together reaffi rmed their status quo relationship. Thus he sees 
euergetism as an act of legitimation both on the part of the 
benefactor elite citizen and the non-elite citizen recipient that 
served several ends.33 The fi rst was to maintain the stability 
and internal cohesion of the city when extreme wealth 
differentials had developed. The second was to mask the 
apparent decline in the power of the democratic assemblies 
(by which cities still presented themselves to the world, 
as seen in inscriptions). And, lastly, Zuiderhoek sees civic 
benefaction as the means to naturalize the ongoing transition 
from that of the classical Greek ideology of isonomia, that 
is, the political equality of citizens,34 to an ideology more 
congruent with the extant hierarchical order. 
Zuiderhoek has amassed a database of more than 500 
benefactions from inscriptions from throughout Asia Minor, 
especially emphasizing the west, where likely more inscriptions 
were produced and more have been found through dedicated 
epigraphic and archaeological work. His inscriptions come 
from cities with some antiquity as well as provinces with 
newer Greek cities. Elsewhere I have suggested that his 
interpretation of civic benefaction as an act of legitimization 
may well describe the situation for the older Greek cities.35 For 
the newer cities of Lycia, for example, where tribal lineages 
rather than democratic Greek institutions may have played a 
more important role in organizing social interactions, other 
interpretations, explored below, may be necessary. 
Public benefactions are associated with critical interactions 
occurring both within the city and also between cities. Within 
the city, the rise of public benefactions seems associated with 
both increased inter-individual competition and expanding 
wealth that allowed for social mobility among citizens in 
the Hellenistic period and later among freedman in the early 
Imperial period.36 Gleason and Price highlight the competition 
for reputation that occurred among elite individuals and 
families during the early Imperial period in Asia Minor.37 In 
part, the inter-individual competition may have been driven 
by simple scalar effects: in two cities – one small, one large, 
both with the same civic institutions – the opportunities for 
individual access to those institutions will be more limited in 
the case of the city with a larger body of citizens. However, 
differential wealth seems to have exacerbated this situation, 
so that for the later Hellenistic and early imperial times, the 
emergence of an oligarchy, with more of the sacral offi ces 
becoming secular and more of the secular civic offi ces being 
assumed by individuals and families for life, is evident.38 
For the Imperial period (and perhaps extendable to the 
earlier Hellenistic period), Zuiderhoek offers a neo-Ricardian 
analysis that highlights increasing population and limited 
agricultural land, leading to the relative scarcity and hence 
increased value of the latter.39 Thus, holders of agricultural 
land became relatively wealthier over this interval. One may 
also note the climatic amelioration that occurred during the 
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later Hellenistic and early Imperial period, which may have 
led to increased agricultural productivity at this time.40
Along with expanding wealth, however, were growing 
disparities in the distribution of wealth both in the later 
Hellenistic period and Imperial period.41 By the Imperial 
period, an estimated five percent of the population – 
senators, knights, and councilors – held most of the wealth.42 
Coincidentally and, I argue below, exactly what might be 
expected, we see an increase in ostentatious displays in habit 
and in the kinds of benefactions now made.43
Finally, there is another component to the dynamic of 
inter-individual or inter-family competition that is likely 
demographic in nature. As has been argued for classical 
Athens, demographic processes operated to introduce an 
element of uncertainty with consequences for the maintenance 
of familial wealth.44 That is, given deliberately limited fertility, 
husbands typically 10 years older than wives, manipulated 
birth/sex ratios that favored males, and possible early death, 
the likelihood that a wealthy elite family remained a wealthy 
elite family for more than several generations was low.45
At the inter-city or regional level, various kinds of 
interaction have been recognized. Ma sees the Greek cities 
of Anatolia as more or less homologous polities that engaged 
in inter-state arbitration; requests for and granting of asylia 
(inviolability) between cities, effected through individual 
negotiations; the dispatching of envoys from cities with 
famous shrines and festivals to announce festivals to other 
cities, where they were grandly received; and the practice 
of foreign arbitrators responding to requests from individual 
cities.46 The culture shared by the Greek cities is refl ected in 
their common architectural, ideological, and textual idioms,47 
a textbook example of the kind of interaction Renfrew and 
Cherry defi ne for peer polities.48
In addition to more amicable relations, competition is 
also seen. Territorial disputes are rife in the Hellenistic 
period49 and continue into the Imperial period, even in the 
pacifi ed environment created under Augustus.50 In addition, 
long-standing rivalries between various cities continued, as 
for Ephesus and Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna, Prusa 
and Apameia, Tyre and Sidon, Nicaea and Nicomedia. 
Emperors bestowed or removed the titles of “First City 
of…” and cities competed for these titles. City status might 
determine tax relief or might bring other resources from 
the emperor.51 Furthermore, city status would determine 
how city delegations were seated at games and order in 
processions at religious festivals and “[g]overnors would 
play rival cities off against each other and in this way, hide 
their wrong-doing.”52 
Inter-city rivalries had a material component, with cities 
attempting to outdo the other with grand building plans. There 
was a danger in being too grandiose, however, as a corrector 
might be dispatched by Rome to reorganize city fi nances.53 
During the high Imperial period, competitive civic building 
gave way to agonistic inter-city competitions.54
In sum, the practice of acknowledged public benefactions 
is a social, political, and economic phenomenon recognized 
for the Greek urban world that continues in an evolved form 
into the Roman Imperial period where it joined the more 
Roman practice of patronage. Over the years, researchers 
have sought to explain its existence and frequency using 
a variety of perspectives sketched above.55 Below, I argue 
for viewing it as a costly signal emitted by individuals 
and by groups, by citizens and by cities; framing it in this 
fashion buys us the ability to better parse the processes of 
urbanization that unfolded very differently in tribal societies 
of a borderlands like western Rough Cilicia versus the older 
Greek cities of Anatolia. 
3. Signaling theory
Signaling theory is a subset of Darwinian thinking that 
considers the benefi ts that accrue to individuals or groups 
who rapidly learn about each other’s capabilities through 
non-lethal means. The signal, a behavioral or material 
display with particular characteristics, serves as the conduit 
of communication. With this information about individual or 
group attributes, people can make decisions in their best self-
interest. People can decide to avoid the shirker and marry the 
over-achiever. Similarly, groups may decide to stay clear of 
a formidable group or, if nearby and potentially threatening, 
may decide to ally themselves. The point of departure for 
signaling theory is that through acts on the part of a signaler, 
hidden qualities are accurately displayed; assessments of 
those hidden qualities are thus made and then acted upon 
by the receiver. 
Signaling theory, focusing on quality and other properties 
of the signal, has been the subject of much recent scholarship 
in anthropology.56 Fraser Neiman fi rst deployed these ideas 
in archaeological interpretation and since then others have 
followed.57 In their recent review, Bird and Smith fi nd 
common ground between costly signaling and ideas explored 
by Thorstein Veblen on conspicuous consumption by the 
newly rich, Marcel Mauss on gift-giving in non-capitalist 
societies as the means to win and keep prestige and political 
authority, and Pierre Bourdieu on the notion of social capital 
and its relationship to economic and symbolic capital.58
While a costly signaling approach to social analysis may 
be dismissed as another simplistic reductionist approach that 
assumes human behavior is rational, I use it here as a device 
to organize research that examines the tension between the 
individual and the group (in this case, the citizen and the 
city), which may drive institutional changes, and to consider 
the materiality of social transactions. 
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Signaling is usefully described in terms of the signals ex-
changed between more or less homologous entities, senders 
and receivers.59 Senders send a signal in the form of material 
displays – underwriting a festival, constructing a monument, 
wearing 15 kilos of fancy jades – that advertise critical 
hidden capabilities such as access to resources, kin groups, 
or knowledge or personal characteristics (relative health, 
charisma, organizational skills, strength, endurance). Individual 
receivers, receiving signals from multiple senders, assess 
the quality of the signal and infer the quality of the sender, 
especially with regard to the hidden capabilities of interest. 
Signals have a variety of properties. They may be of varying 
quality, they may be emitted frequently or infrequently, they 
may be broadcast far or directed towards nearby audiences. 
Signals may have target audiences of varying composition. 
Signaling theory is usually discussed in terms of individual 
or family signaling and more recently in terms of the social 
group of varying sizes and composition.
Costly signaling has been the focus of most anthropological 
applications of signaling theory and seeks to make under-
standable conspicuous displays seen in a range of societies. 
The idea here is that “the cost of the display functions to 
ensure that only high-quality individuals can afford them at 
all. Thus, the signal value of conspicuous consumption is 
maintained by its costs; these costs in turn are the price wealthy 
individuals pay for prestige.”60 Treatments of social behaviors 
from a costly signaling perspective make several empirically 
demonstrable and reasonable assumptions. For one, variation 
exists: particular desirable attributes such as mediation skills, 
charisma, physical stamina and family connections all vary 
within a population of individuals. Within a population of 
groups, asabiyya, or the ability of a group of individuals to 
act as a coherent unit, may also vary.61 Second, it is in the 
best self-interest of the sender to try to deceive the receivers, 
that is, to try to project themselves as wealthier, or stronger, 
or better connected than they actually are. This being the 
case, it is therefore also in the best interest of the receivers 
to accurately evaluate the signals being sent. These factors 
operating together create a situation wherein costly signals in 
fact honestly represent the capabilities of the senders. Only 
those individuals or groups that actually are wealthy, strong, 
or well-endowed with connections will be able to sustain this 
costly signal.
Most treatments of costly signaling in anthropology 
have focused on signaling occurring within a single level, 
that is, at the level of individuals or families, although 
some consideration of piggy-backing, that is, conjoined 
individual-group signaling, has also been offered.62 A recent 
examination for contact era New Guinea by Paul Roscoe 
offers a compelling analysis of what he terms social signaling, 
which plays out at both the individual and group levels but 
also links these levels.63 By social signaling, Roscoe refers 
to symbolic or ritualized fi ghting in which true fi ghting 
capabilities are put on display but little blood is actually shed. 
For individuals signaling their capacities within complex 
and dynamic social groups, social signaling is critical to 
the maintenance of group effectiveness, if not harmony. To 
resolve internal confl icts, men engage in public, ritualized 
contests of song, dance, or head-thumping; superiority 
is established and all live to fi ght for the group the next 
day. Abilities critical to supporting group competitiveness 
– stamina, courage, strength, mental agility, and acuity – are 
put on display for all to evaluate and individuals and families 
accordingly decide whom to support. 
At the group level, Roscoe recognizes social signaling 
by clans to other clans and by villages to other villages. 
He distinguishes three forms: conspicuous distributions 
(fabulous feasts), conspicuous performances (“elaborately 
choreographed exhibitions of singing, dancing, and music 
mounted by spectacularly decorated performers”),64 and 
conspicuous constructions (gigantic cult houses built by 
clans). In the elaborate dances, the contributions of the 
individual are masked by costumes as they are in the 
massive cult house constructions. All three media – material, 
performance, and architecture – reliably communicate 
the number of kin and allies willing to support collective 
projects, the abilities of contributing individuals, and the fact 
that individuals are willing to bend their interests to larger-
scale, well-organized efforts. That is, they are an index of 
a group’s asabiyya or their potential for effective collective 
action. Roscoe also recognizes another kind of signal that 
may allow for prevarication. Thus, some groups may be so 
effective in manipulating their media that through aesthetics 
that they can present an image of power and danger that is 
not matched by actual strength. 
Already mentioned are different signaling media – song 
contests and duels at the individual level, choreographed 
dances and structures at the group level. This bespeaks that to 
some extent, signaling is conducted in a shared language. If 
the sender signals via poetry recitations in archaic Greek and 
the audience is expecting blood sports in Latin, the message 
may be interpreted improperly. In other words, signaling 
occurs between individuals within a community of peers or 
between polities within a region of peer polities, which by 
defi nition share a common language in architecture, prestige 
trade, and ideological motifs.65 
Signal degradation occurs over space and time. A dance 
may be an effective signal if the audience is within hailing 
distance of the dancers and decidedly less effective if at 
greater distances.66 Communication may occur over larger 
distances, however, through monumental architecture. A 
fortifi cation wall may serve the purpose of defense but may 
also serve as a deterrent, signaling to more distant groups 
“effective community within.” 
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James Boone obliquely considers signal frequency in his 
examination of magnanimity, an apparently altruistic act of 
conspicuous generosity seen in intra- and inter-community 
feasting.67 Boone argues that such acts are the means by 
which an individual with high social status affi rms that 
status, demonstrating that they and their family still retain 
social power, and therefore access to resources and allies. In 
reviewing ethnographic cases from the American northwest 
coast and southwest he fi nds that such displays are often 
offered annually. In addition I would note that individuals, 
in that they are biological entities that mature and age, are 
dynamic in their abilities and capabilities for action and 
the same can be said of groups, composed as they are of 
individuals. Thus, the recurring broadcast of signals by 
individuals and groups is understandable and expectable to 
both maintain and assert claims of high status. 
What do senders and receivers gain from all of this 
signaling? In a competitive situation, both winners and losers 
nevertheless survive and the qualities of each are exposed. 
Over the short-term, while the sender incurs a cost, the 
successful sender reaps benefi ts in the form of increased 
access to mates or higher quality marriage arrangements,68 
preferential access to resources in bad times,69 or access to 
other political or social offi ces. Receivers also gain in that 
they come to know with whom to ally themselves.70 In the 
case of groups in a competitive environment, successful 
groups survive and maintain access to territory. They may also 
recruit defecting individuals from elsewhere and we may see 
the institutions of successful groups being emulated in less 
effective groups,71 as in for example the apparent spread of 
Greek civic institutions during the Hellenistic period.
The signaling potential of architecture is important to 
arguments that follow and so it is useful to briefl y highlight 
that potential here. Several researchers have observed that 
public architecture seems to be often constructed in stressful 
(but not catastrophic) times, such as in the initial phase of a 
new social, political, or economic formation.72 Elliot Abrams 
interprets this pattern in terms of the deliberate formation of 
a group identity; a signaling interpretation might emphasize 
that individuals and groups are asserting not only identity so 
as to differentiate “us” from “them” but, also as importantly, 
signaling their competence and capability to attract continuing 
support.
On the costliness of the signal, Bruce Trigger points to 
monumental architecture, specifi cally those structures that 
exceed in scale and degree of elaboration that which is 
required by their functional role, as communicating where 
the seat of power in a society lies.73 The larger or more 
elaborate the structure, the greater the display of power. Those 
in power may also manipulate space and the positioning of 
architecture to restrict and screen or to encompass and awe.74 
Importantly, public architecture is particularly potent in 
conveying messages to linguistically and ethnically diverse 
groups, such as those commonly making up the populace of 
early and later states.75 Regarding the potential of architecture 
to send an enduring message, Richard Blanton observed, 
commenting on monumental architecture in the Valley of 
Oaxaca in Mexico: “As communications media, monumental 
architecture is actually relatively effi cient. The initial costs 
of construction may be great, but once built a massive 
building or plaza can be seen by thousands of people over 
great lengths of time, broadcasting continuously for even 
thousands of years.”76
In terms of social signaling, Paul Roscoe argues for 
architecture as one of three effective group signals that 
serves as an index of collective action, one that also masks 
the contribution of the individual.77 Boone seems to ignore 
the physicality and thus durable signaling capacity of 
monumental architecture.78 He focuses only on its cost, 
suggesting that such structures are similar to the destructive 
potlatches known historically for American northwest coast 
groups, when during community displays, resources were 
deliberately “burned” or removed from circulation; material 
goods likely became more valuable but also unavailable to 
actually feed or clothe potlatch attendees. I suggest instead 
that the importance resides in the materiality or physicality 
of this architecture, which our stereoscopic vision is adept 
at reading.
In sum, signaling theory and social signaling highlight 
that deeds transcend words in communicating the hidden 
talents of individuals to diverse groups of individuals and of 
groups to other groups. Roscoe’s work is especially important 
here, focusing as it does on the effectiveness of individual 
signaling within groups and also group signaling to other 
groups within regions.79 In effect, he is arguing for a form 
of multi-level signaling, a kind of thinking in evolutionary 
circles that brings “the group” back into equations that until 
recently only reckoned the selective benefi ts of behaviors 
on individuals and their kin. Group effectiveness and thus 
selection for solidarist behaviors on the part of individuals 
seems especially critical in environments that are rife with 
inter-group competition,80 or are otherwise inchoate.81
4. Civic buildings and public benefactions as 
individual and communal signals in Hellenistic 
Anatolia and imperial Asia Minor
In the emic sense, the public benefactions documented for 
Hellenistic Anatolia and early imperial Asia Minor were, 
as represented in texts, gifts of elite benefactors to the 
citizenry. From an etic perspective, however, they may be 
considered signals being emitted by individuals within a 
dynamic community composed of other individuals and also 
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deliberately recruited and emitted by communities sharing 
Greek urban culture within a dynamic social landscape. 
The acknowledgement of the benefactions, testifi ed to in 
inscriptions and statues, tells us certain signals were received 
and accepted by institutions of the citizenry.
In considering public benefactions as signals, in which 
a material display references hidden capabilities, I suggest 
an argument similar to that offered by Neiman for the 
so-called Maya collapse: pyramid construction and stelae 
erection,82 signals emitted by competing families, ceased 
as potential receivers defected to more productive locales.83 
For Hellenistic Anatolia and Imperial Asia Minor, civic 
benefactions appear when and where they do as conditions 
associated with signaling at both individual and communal 
levels prevail. The nature of the signal, such as public 
buildings versus other kinds of benefactions, also varies 
through time as the potential audience expands to include 
diverse groups within the city or observers external to the 
city. Conditions associated with signaling differ according 
to political geography and scalar factors, specifi cally the 
composition and sizes of receiving audiences as well as the 
availability of wealth to be devoted towards signaling. Thus, 
the trajectory of civic benefactions seen in western Rough 
Cilicia should look somewhat different from that observed 
farther to the west because of its status as a borderlands, 
because of the smaller cities there, and because of the 
limited wealth available to support individual signaling. That 
communities may have been attempting to relay commitment 
to Roman social order in a time of unrest, a version of what 
Blanton refers to in his analysis of domestic architecture as 
canonical communication,84 may also be important in the 
case of western Rough Cilicia. 
Cities within regions
At the level of cities within a region, it is useful to distinguish 
between a region like western Anatolia and Asia Minor, 
interacting with peer cities, and a borderlands situation, like 
that seen for western Rough Cilicia and possibly also Lycia, 
where interacting communities appear not to have shared a 
common parlance.
Peer cities 
The textbook treatment of euergetism and civic benefactions 
was offered by Veyne and others for the interacting polities of 
Hellenistic western Anatolia and later Imperial Asia Minor.85 
Here, polities, operating within a shared Greek urban culture, 
both cooperated and competed with each other through 
challenges of the microimperialism of neighboring cities and 
local dynasts, natural disasters such as earthquakes, and the 
geopolitical turmoil associated with the expanding Roman 
core polity, itself a dynamic entity. And, even with the Pax 
Romana, the emperor and other agents of Rome contended 
with the recurring squabbles of the Greek cities each vying 
for territory and status.86
By the Hellenistic period, Greek cities in this region shared 
the institutional apparatus for collective action, such as an 
increasingly oligarchic council and assembly. Nevertheless, 
history is clear that some cities were more adept than others 
in making corporate decisions and executing collective 
acts. Cities differentially survived and thrived. Analysis 
of the differential success of individual cities considers 
the effectiveness of military action,87 as well as diplomatic 
embassies, in waging and weathering the “small wars” for 
territory.88 In the case of the so-called “big wars,” waged by 
vying Successor kings and external core polities for tribute, 
it is clear that city or city factions made both good and bad 
decisions. Thus, some cities, formerly part of the Attalid 
kingdom (for example, Pergamum, Ephesus, and Sardis), 
were granted freedom by Rome to acknowledge their support 
during the war against the usurper Aristonicus. On the other 
hand, many Greek cities were punished for their decision to 
support Mithridates IV in his rebellion against Rome with 
exorbitant tribute requirements, inheritances stripped, and 
fees charged for boarding Roman troops.89
Signaling theory invites us to consider the role of 
communal signals – and I especially emphasize public 
architecture – in communicating the potential for effective 
collective action to local enemies and allies, in the case of 
the little wars for territory and, more distantly, to agents of 
Rome and other core polities. Fortifi cation walls and forts 
served to protect but also may have served as a costly signal 
and hence as a deterrent. For example, John Camp reports for 
Herakleia under Latmos in Asia Minor that the city circuit 
walls appear deliberately monumental.90 More generally, in 
the Hellenistic period, prytaneia and bouleuteria became 
more massive and were built of expensive exotic materials; 
they are often ornately outfi tted as previously seen only for 
temples.91 And, for the early Imperial period, temples and 
sanctuaries for the imperial cult transformed the cities of 
Asia Minor.92 With the high Imperial period, massive bath 
complexes (fed by aqueducts carrying water across previously 
hostile territories now quiet owing to the Pax Romana) 
dominated cities.93 But not all cities were equally outfi tted 
with monumental architecture. Did some cities, such as those 
building elaborate fortifi cations or public buildings, fare 
better in attracting new citizens or favors from the emperor? 
Signaling theory would anticipate that this is the case, but 
the proposition requires evaluation.
Cities in Borderlands
As emphasized above, signaling is effective only if it is 
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carried out by senders and receivers that share the same 
cultural language. In borderlands, while interaction may 
take place, by defi nition, it occurs across power or culture 
frontiers. Borderlands are ambiguous landscapes wherein 
“two or more groups come into contact with each other, 
where people of different cultural backgrounds occupy the 
same territory and where the space between them grows 
intimate.”94 While some borderlands are rather simple, with 
just a few articulating cultures and with some degree of 
temporal stability, Hellenistic and Roman western Rough 
Cilicia were borderlands in the extreme. As summarized by 
Nicholas Rauh et al., the rugged landscape of western Rough 
Cilicia was occupied in antiquity by small (compared with 
Greek cities of western Anatolia or Asia Minor) communities 
of Luwian-speakers with a subsistence base dominated by 
pastoralism or agro-pastoralism and organized in terms of 
lineages.95 Texts indicate that western Rough Cilicia was 
claimed and possibly partially developed by local chieftains 
as well as a series of core polities that included Persia, various 
Hellenistic Successors, and fi nally Rome. The relatively 
accessible stands of cedar and other strategic resources 
critical to sea-power in the region seem to have attracted 
the attention of polities but all were attempting to assert 
their claims over relatively large distances, meaning that 
their claims were always diffi cult to sustain for any stretch 
of time. This rugged borderland situation also contributed 
to western Rough Cilicia becoming a haven for pirates and 
brigands, especially during the late Hellenistic period, with 
which various core polities grappled in succession.96 
The critical point here is that it was not until imperial 
Roman times that many or most of the local polities in interior 
Anatolia in general and western Rough Cilicia in particular 
came to share a semblance of Greco-Roman civic culture.97 
In the case of western Rough Cilicia, Roman involvement in 
the area was via client kings and queens who, with help from 
Roman troops, struggled with local rebellions through the early 
Imperial period.98 From the high Imperial period, inscriptions 
mention the probouloi (panel of 12 councilors, which ran 
the city council), dekaprotoi (local dignitaries who assumed 
responsibility for paying taxes and levies), and city offi cers, 
thus obliquely referring to Hellenistic civic institutions.99
In addition, public buildings – agoras, bouleuteria, baths, 
and temples as well as enclosures for display of honorifi c 
statues – were constructed at this time, their relative age at 
various sites established through association with Roman 
period ceramics and affi nities with other dated structures.100 
Conspicuous in their absence are other structures commonly 
seen in contemporaneous Greco-Roman cities to the east 
and west: arenas, gymnasia, and theatres.101 Given that the 
architecture of western Rough Cilicia is known solely through 
what is expressed on the surface, it is possible that such 
structures are yet to be found, although, given the large size 
of the missing structures, this seems unlikely. Importantly, 
other public structures – monumental tombs situated within 
the city proper – bespeak other, presumably indigenous, 
infl uences.102 
Regarding the nature of interaction, whether competitive 
or cooperative, between and among the small cities of western 
Rough Cilicia, some evidence exists. For the Hellenistic 
period, occupational remains in the form of ceramics and 
burials appear confi ned to defensible hilltops, and Rauh 
reports Hellenistic fortifi cations throughout the area.103 For 
the early Imperial period, Kurt Tomaschitz’s analysis of 
inscriptions points to participation in the region-wide network 
of agonistic festivals, suggesting inter-city competition 
occurred within the constraints of Pax Romana.104
I have already alluded to regional unrest in the early 
Imperial period as well as in the third century and beyond. 
Under these circumstances, sending communal signals that 
relay a strong commitment to Imperial Roman world order, as 
well as the emperor and his intermediaries, local client kings 
and queens, may have been well rewarded. That is, agoras were 
not simply marketplaces for transacting various commercial 
activities; their form also communicated participation in 
the larger Greco-Roman world (communicating to external 
agents) and possibly also served as media in the public 
relations war with other local communities. Thus, to the extent 
allowed by surface remains, it may be useful to consider 
city size and endurance with respect to the outlay of public 
structures – their monumentality, the degree to which they 
are incorporated into the fabric of the city – present here.
Individuals within cities
The benefactions of wealthy elite individuals must also be 
considered in the context of inter-individual interaction, 
that is, interactions between citizens within the city. These 
interactions may differ because of simple scalar differences 
between populous and less populous cities and also because 
of the presence and distribution of societal wealth.
Focusing on the latter fi rst, through Hellenistic and 
especially imperial times there seems to be a general increase 
in personal wealth. For the imperial period, scholars attribute 
this increase to the lack of major confl ict and the construction 
of all-weather roads that linked cities and reduced the cost 
of commerce as well as the creation of a coherent legal 
system.105 Outside of Rough Cilicia, evidence for the increase 
in circulating wealth is found in more meat consumption and 
taller stature.106
In addition to an increase in personal wealth, however, 
there seems to be a marked increase in wealth differentials, 
at least in western Asia Minor, as sketched above. Landed 
individuals became relatively more wealthy compared to 
others as population increased and land became relatively 
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scarcer,107 and possibly also as agriculture became more 
productive owing to climatic shifts.108 Zuiderhoek fi nds 
that, excluding gifts of entire buildings, 60% of the public 
benefactions attested to by inscription in his database are 
small, 1000 denarii or less.109 But, by Zuiderhoek’s reckoning, 
1000 denarii represents 80% of the annual income that 
would come from rent on land valued at 25,000 denarii, the 
minimum wealth requirement for a citizen seeking a position 
as a councilor. So, even these small benefactions are being 
made by a class of families we might call wealthy, although 
perhaps not excessively wealthy. 
But were what appear to be costly signals indeed costly? 
Zuiderhoek argues that the benefactions offered by the 
wealthy were not particularly burdensome, representing 
a small fraction – perhaps 5% – of elite wealth.110 His 
characterization may be true when the merely wealthy and 
the super-wealthy are considered in aggregate. As the costly 
signaling literature emphasizes, however, whether a signal is 
costly depends on how it impacts an individual’s reproductive 
capacity, something very diffi cult for us to assess. For the 
Imperial period, we know individuals attempted to shift 
imposed liturgies to others and that civic obligations might 
ruin a family and had to be managed very carefully.111 This 
pattern suggests that real costs are being incurred by at least 
some of the wealthy. And fi nally sumptuary laws were enacted 
during the period 100 BC to AD 50 to rein in the incredible 
displays of wealth being made by individuals, thereby 
providing cover so aristocrats could avoid bankruptcy.112 In 
spite of being excused from liturgies, in the second century 
after Christ we see individuals nevertheless making substantial 
benefactions, which are duly noted in inscriptions.113 All of 
this suggests that public benefactions represent individual or 
family signals that were indeed costly.
What did these individual signals convey? Certainly they 
conveyed family wealth, some of which could be directed 
towards other citizens or solidaristic activities, but other 
talents were also exposed. I suggest that individuals with 
the education, charisma, and skills to successfully negotiate 
complex gifts with council and assembly are being identifi ed 
and these same skills are recruited for use by the city on 
embassies to or as mediators in other cities,114 or to the local 
agent of Rome to lobby for favors.115 Marc Waelkens sees 
this role as important for the later Hellenistic period but 
downplays it for the Imperial period,116 yet others highlight 
the importance of these talents in dealing with agents of 
Rome.117 Especially in the times of unrest, such as the fi rst 
century BC in western Asia Minor, these talents were valued 
and rewarded; in the mid-fi rst century after Christ for southern 
Asia Minor, the unrest here might also have created an 
environment in which diplomatic talent could shine. 
Along with increasing wealth and wealth differentials, the 
Hellenistic and Imperial periods are marked by an increased 
dynamism to the social landscape as more families with means 
vie for a restricted number of seats of power. Council size was 
more or less scaled to city size, with smaller cities (for example, 
Halicarnassus) having councils of 100 or under and moderate 
sized cities like Aphrodisias a council of 200; Ephesus, one 
of the larger cities in Asia Minor, seated a council of 450 
members.118 Given more contenders for a set number of council 
positions, the ostentatious behavior by wealthy elites in the 
late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods and the increasing 
gate fees incurred to enter into council membership become 
understandable. Part and parcel of this may be the propoganda 
offered on particular individuals; in her analysis of inscriptions 
referring to aedilitian euergetism in Hellenistic Anatolia, 
Laure Marest-Caffey notes important changes, from brief 
descriptions of euergetai and euergetism in Anatolian cities 
for the middle Hellenistic period (prior to the second century 
BC) to lengthy descriptions of the education, grooming, career, 
and many benefactions of the euergetai in the later Hellenistic 
(from the second century to 33 BC).119 
By imperial times, council membership had become quite 
exclusive, with the council composed of ex-magistrates and 
men of hereditary wealth. To enter the council, initiates 
must have owned property above a specifi c threshold and 
perhaps have been a member of the ephebia. They sometimes 
paid an honorarium to enter the council and were seated 
for life. If magistrates were elected (by the citizens), their 
candidacy was predetermined by the extant council. By the 
high Imperial period, councilors and their families began to 
identify themselves as the ruling class and assumed a defi ning 
lifestyle expressed in gymnasial athletics, distinct forms of 
literature, and euergetism.120
In effect, Zuiderhoek argues that benefactions had two 
different audiences. Potential members of the council are 
demonstrating their many virtues to seated members of 
the council through acts of benefi cence.121 In the parlance 
of signaling – and similar to Veblen’s observations on the 
nouveau riche of late 19th century America122 – the wealthy 
elite are signaling their virtues to the gatekeepers of power, 
other wealthy councilors. There is a second audience, 
however: the various professional collegia exercised some 
power and the assembly also retained some clout.123 Thus, 
a signal designed to impress both elites and the demos was 
likely the most effective.
5. Signaling in western Asia Minor and 
western Rough Cilicia
With these general observations on wealth and the dynamic 
social landscape of individuals, let us now consider how 
signaling may play out in sizable cities of western Asia Minor 
compared with the smaller communities found both in the 
west and in western Rough Cilicia.
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Individuals in large cities
Larger cities, such as Pergamon and Ephesus, saw the co-
residence of multiple kin groups as well as, by imperial 
times, portions of families, as individual family members 
pursued opportunities throughout the greater Mediterranean 
world.124 Multiple languages – Greek, native, “foreign” and 
later Latin – were spoken here, with Greek the language of 
civic discourse and with Greek and Latin beginning to replace 
local native languages.125
In such a diverse social context, we might expect to see 
signaling that has a major material or physical component, 
such as monumental public architecture, as individuals 
speak to an international, multi-lingual audience. Moreover, 
given the costs of building in antiquity, the construction of 
monumental structures sends a powerful signal about the 
capabilities of the contenders. 
Individuals in smaller cities
In smaller cities and communities, individuals, families, and 
the capabilities of each might be well known to the other 
residents, a domain in which signaling may be of less utility, 
per discussion by Neiman. On the other hand, Boone and 
Roscoe highlight the role of signaling as families attempt 
to assert and maintain their status within a community that 
allows for some social mobility.
Where multiple language communities were highlighted 
for the larger cities of western Asia Minor, the (male) residents 
of interior villages and cities may have been monolingual, 
speaking their native language, or bilingual, with some 
acquired knowledge of Greek.126 In the smaller cities of Rough 
Cilicia, residents likely spoke Luwian and later Greek as well. 
Ten Cate’s analysis shows that compound Luwian-Greek 
names appear late in the sequence, when urban communities 
develop in interior Rough Cilicia under Vespasian. Analysis 
by Rauh and colleagues allows differentiation between coastal 
and inland cities: for inland sites, almost 100% of the names 
appearing in inscriptions are Luwian or Greco-Luwian; in 
coastal cities, 75% (Coracesium) to 88% (Iotape) are Luwian 
or Greco-Luwian, the remainder being Greek or Latin.127 In 
more or less linguistically homogenous communities such 
as these, architecture may be a less effective communication 
device.
In the case of western Rough Cilicia, we are dealing 
with smaller communities with much smaller capacities 
overall for wealth. The bouleuterion at Asar Tepe seated an 
estimated 55–60 councilors, while at Nephelion, the structure 
there interpreted as a small theatre or bouleuterion, likely 
accommodated fewer than 100.128 Wealth in antiquity is 
scaled primarily to the holding of agricultural land, which in 
western Rough Cilicia may have been quite limited given the 
rugged terrain here. On the other hand, this area possessed 
tracts of highly valued cedars, presumably still under native 
control.129 Depending on the native land use system in place, 
the usual calculation of wealth may have to be reconfi gured to 
account for wealth generated by access to strategic resources, 
with those resources possibly managed not by individuals or 
individual families, but by tribal lineages.
The presumed native lineage system seems to have been 
quite strong here, as evidenced by frequent references to 
family members in honorifi c inscriptions.130 In addition 
to population size and degree of wealth then, the number 
and sizes of these lineages may be even more critical to 
an understanding of signaling. That is, if a community 
consists of just a few lineages, again following Neiman’s 
arguments, there is little advantage in investing in signals; 
no new knowledge is gained. On the other hand, if lineages 
are numerous and in an environment made inchoate by dint 
of demographic forces, new sources of power and wealth 
made available by access to the wider Mediterranean under 
the Pax Romana, and instability fostered by resistance to 
the Roman world order, then we might expect to see a more 
signifi cant expression of signaling by lineages.
6. Signaling in western Rough Cilicia
In the case of western Rough Cilicia, signaling via civic 
benefactions and public buildings is expected but the impetus 
for – and form of that signal – should vary from that seen 
further to the west or east.
At the scale of communities, the degree and kind of 
inter-city interaction is diffi cult to gauge, but what does 
seem important is signaling to agents of Rome about the 
commitment of a community to support the Roman order, 
which seems to have had a somewhat fragile hold with 
recurring need for support. Thus, construction of public 
buildings, like agoras, bouleuteria, and baths, but especially 
temples or other signs of the emperor cult, such as additions to 
the honorifi c enclosed areas, might have conveyed this signal, 
both to agents of Rome and would be rebellious factions.
Elsewhere in the greater Mediterranean basin during the 
early Imperial period we fi nd the construction of arenas or 
the refi tting of theatres to support games. To date, no sign of 
such populace-oriented structures have been found in western 
Rough Cilicia, although Karamut and Russell do describe 
one structure at Nephelion as a possible small theatre.131 
Rauh and colleagues interpret this pattern as evidence for 
the large infl uence of the council, seating the heads of local 
native families, who used, in the parlance suggested here, 
modest forms of Roman order architecture to signal their 
elite status.132 Two other possibilities follow: the amount of 
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circulating wealth may have been insuffi cient to support such 
massive constructions, or, alternatively, the way that wealth 
was managed by lineage structures meant that only relatively 
smaller public buildings could be constructed. 
7. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have attempted to argue that civic benefac-
tions, in part responsible for the construction of public 
buildings in Asia Minor, are more than simply individual gifts. 
Rather, these material manifestations in effect substantially 
signal the competence and pro-social orientation of individuals 
and lineages. Aggregated by the city, they also signal that 
the community itself is competent and able to recruit and 
recognize the individual talents of its citizens. The application 
of social signaling to the Greco-Roman world, with its 
institution of public benefactions and monumental “habit,” 
appears very productive. Finally, as a result of examining 
social signaling in this context, this exercise also expands 
the utility of social signaling as an analytic construct.
In the area of Asia Minor urbanism, the signaling approach 
focuses attention on the differential success, i.e., persistence 
and spread, of civic structures or the citizens who fashioned 
them. More specifi cally, it posits a relationship between 
the splendor of communal signals and the persistence of 
communities emitting them, something quite researchable 
with the textual, archaeological, and numismatic record for 
Asia Minor. It also suggests that public buildings should 
be an important signal early on, communicating very 
graphically the presence of civic institutions to linguistically 
diverse audiences. Such structures may also have helped to 
attract citizen recruits133 as well as favors from Rome. Once 
the cityscape was constructed, however, other means of 
communal signaling were found; the “architecture channel” 
was already “saturated.” At this point, an increase in festivals 
and competitions should be seen.134 
In the case of urbanism in western Rough Cilicia, other 
expectations are inspired by signaling thinking. The question 
of wealth – amount and distribution – becomes prominent. 
How much wealth can be garnered from the agricultural or 
mixed agricultural-pastoral-marine subsistence base? (How 
ancient are the terraced inner valleys here, which today 
support seemingly very productive “Gardens of Eden”?) 
Alternatively, was wealth available to these communities 
from the harvest of stands of cedar? Should the occurrence 
of small-scale bouleuteria, baths, and somewhat grand (for 
example, Lamus) agoras here, but no arenas or theatres, be 
read as an index of the relative wealth of the area? How did 
western Rough Cilicia communities with different kinds or 
numbers of public buildings fare with respect to support from 
Rome during times of unrest? Did such structures attract 
unwelcome attention from fractious native elements in the 
Isaurian hinterland?
In the area of signaling, I have offered several elaborations, 
including the role of peer interaction. That is, signaling does 
not exist in a vacuum but occurs between more or less 
homologous entities that speak the same cultural language. 
Having said this, it is worth noting that communal signaling 
to receivers beyond peers, in this case by newly recognized 
western Rough Cilicia communities to agents of Rome, 
may be quite important, especially in times of unrest and 
rebellion. 
Finally, much of the literature on signaling expressly 
focuses on individuals, families, and larger kin structures.135 
Here, the focus is on cities with particular republican (that is, 
supra-kin forms of law-based government) civic structures, 
which supplant or augment kin structures. Cities competing 
with other cities for citizens and for favors from Rome 
engaged in a kind of signaling appropriate to their context, 
with public buildings sometimes donated by wealthy elites 
and sometimes constructed by “the city.” Other signals, 
games and festivals, also served as the media of inter-city 
competition.
In sum, the signaling approach opens a broad avenue for 
research on the nature and form of urbanism in Anatolia and 
Asia Minor. The rich textual, archaeological, and numismatic 
record from this landscape, along with the natural challenges 
posed by in-silting harbors and earthquakes, allow for 
an extraordinary laboratory within which to explore the 
relationship between social signal form and consequence, 
especially at the communal level. 
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